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Problem Formulation and Organizational Decision-Making:
Biases and Assumptions Underlying Alternative Models
of Strategic Problem Formulation
This paper reviews the major theoretical approaches to strategic
problem formulation and provides some constructs for further theory
development. It proposes a number of models for structuring and ana-
lyzing strategic problem formulation processes and identifies the
biases and assumptions that provide the foundations for these models.
Successful strategic problem formulation is described and proposed as
a beginning point for future research.

Introduction
Strategic management is concerned fundamentally with how strategic
decisions are made. Researchers in strategic decision processes stress
the need to examine how strategic decisions arise, are perceived, and
are formulated by management. A critical task of upper-level manage-
ment involves the identification and structuring of the most important
problems threatening the organization's ability to survive and adapt
in the future. These are not the everyday, routine problems but the
problems and issues that are unique, important and frequently ambi-
guous (McCaskey, 1982).
Mason and Mitroff (1981) specify the characteristics of these
vexing strategic problems, which they call 'wicked problems.' They
are distinguished by interconnectedness to other problems, complexity
with recursive feedback, uncertainty in a dynamic environment, ambi-
guity dependent on viewpoint, conflicting trade-offs of alternative
solutions, and societal constraints to theoretical solutions. Every
problem is inextricably united to the environment in which it is
embedded.
Thus in today's rapidly changing environment, the ability to sense
the emergence of, and to assign meaning to, unanticipated environmental
events which may be signals of these "wicked problems" describes a
critical strategic capability (Ansoff, 1984). This ability enhances
a firm's opportunities to surpass its competition and to ensure the
coalignment of the organization and its environment (Thompson, 1967).
This is not merely "opportunistic" surveillance but an organizational
process that encompasses the firm's approach to developing awareness
of its most important strategic problems and their characteristics.
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Strategic problem formulation, the process of resolving the nature
of these major strategic problems, is not a new activity for organi-
zations (Lyles, 1981; Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Pounds,
1969). All organizations face problems that have a major impact on the
firm's ability to survive and to adapt to environmental changes. Indeed
it could be argued that those organizations which have successfully
adapted and survived through time must have devised very effective sys-
tems for strategic problem identification and formulation.
Therefore, the issue of how to identify a good strategic problem
formulation process has become an important dilemma identified by a
range of management researchers (Lubin, 1977; Ramaprasad and Mitroff,
1984; Rumelt, 1978; Volkema, 1983). In an attempt to predict and fore-
cast environmental changes, organizations have established forecasting
models and issues management departments. However, it is not always
clear that these necessarily improve the organization's ability to
anticipate, make sense of and formulate critical and strategic problems
(Lenz and Engledow, 1985).
This paper will examine strategic problem formulation from a number
of perspectives. First, areas of consensus regarding strategic problem
formulation will be reviewed. Second, a range of problem formulation
approaches that exist within the theoretical literature will be identi-
fied. Third, the biases and assumptions that underlie each approach
will be discussed and fourth, some ideas for future research regarding
the nature of successful strategic problem formulation will be out-
1 ined.
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AREAS OF AGREEMENT
Although there are probably many more areas of disagreement than
areas of agreement in research about strategic problem formulation, it
is useful to outline the areas of agreement in order to lay a foun-
dation for the later discussion of alternative problem formulation
approaches. The purpose here is to identify major concepts rather than
offer an exhaustive literature review.
Nature of Strategic Problems
Strategic problems have frequently been referred to as "unstruc-
tured," messy or wicked problems (Ackoff, 1974; Mitroff and Mason, 1980)
They have a significant influence on the organization as a whole and
are more complex and ill-defined than other problems. There is no
proven algorithm for formulating these problems, no clear relation-
ship between problem definition and best solution, no single way to
explain discrepancies in understanding and no repli cabi 1 i ty (Mason and
Mitroff, 1981; Thomas, 1984).
Some strategic problems are well structured (i.e., there is rela-
tively widespread consensus as to the single best definition of the
problem). These are frequently problems that have been imposed on the
organization, as in the case of governmental regulations or union
negotiations (Lyles and Mitroff, 1980). However, most strategic
problems are unstructured, and no single "best" way for formulating
the nature of the problem exists. In these problems, the formulation
process becomes a critical aspect of the strategic decision-making
process
.
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Awareness Process
Figure 1 addresses the process by which organizations become aware
of environmental events. Formalized processes keep the organization
aware of environmental events that have been preidentif ied or antici-
pated, at least in the broadest sense (Fahey and King, 1977). As the
environment becomes more uncertain and more complex, it becomes diffi-
cult to anticipate all environmental events. These unanticipated events
are usually sensed through informal means (Ansoff, 1984; Cowan, 1984;
Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; Mintzberg, 1973; Quinn, 1980). The managers
who become aware of these events assign meaning and definition to
them. In the study by Lyles and Mitroff (1980), about 80 percent of
the managers said they became aware of a problem's existence from in-
formal indicators. Quinn (1980) suggests that executives become aware
of these changes primarily through personal networks that are used to
short-circuit the formal indicators.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Resolving the nature of strategic problems becomes an important
task of upper level management. Making sense of complex situations
requires specific cognitive and experiential skills. Managers have to
assign meanings to unanticipated events by making inferences about the
i nterrel atedness of these events to other important events and to the
organization's environment and context.
The Role of Executives in Strategic Problem Formulation (SPF)
It has been well documented that the process of defining the nature
of a problem is dependent upon the histories, backgrounds and experiences
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of those responsible for defining the problem (Bruner and Kresch, 1950;
Hayes and Simon, 1977; Herden and Lyles, 1981; Taylor, 1975).
Ackoff's (1969) famous description of the elevator problem exemplifies
this through its demonstration that engineers will define the problem
as an engineering problem with an engineering solution while psycholo-
gists will define the problem through their own framework.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) note that strategic decisions are
affected by the cognitive frames and maps of the organization's senior
executives. Thus upper level managers can be expected to define the
nature of strategic problems and solutions through their own frame-
works (Ramaprasad and Mitroff, 1984). The way that problems are
defined limits the set of solutions that are considered relevant.
Hence the way firms sense the existence of strategic problems and
resolve the nature of them has an impact on their strategic alter-
natives. Hedberg (1974) suggests that an "organizational decision-
maker's choice of strategy is determined by the perceived problem, the
available degrees of freedom (the action space) and a preference
function." Starbuck and Hedberg (1977) expand this concept further by
suggesting that organizations will invent the environment to which the
firm will respond by deciding which aspects of the environment are
important or unimportant.
Thus the process of defining strategic problems influences the
firm's capabilities for long-term survival. The process by which upper
level executives sense and evaluate these critical problems places con-
straints on the firm's choice of appropriate strategic alternatives.
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The SPF Process
Several ideas have emerged recently concerning the strategic
problem formulation process and the factors that affect it. First,
there appears to be agreement that firms do not expl i ci t ly define unan-
ticipated problems (Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; Volkema, 1983; Ansoff,
1984). In applied settings, solution generation is often adopted as a
means of problem sensing and understanding and appears to be more
important and widespread than consideration of different problem per-
spectives (Mitroff and Betz, 1972; Hertz and Thomas, 1983). Second,
the complexity of strategic problems leads to differing assumptions
regarding the nature of these problems, and this leads to stakeholders
supporting varying views (Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979; Freeman, 1984).
Consequently, research on individual differences regarding problem for-
mulation has generated little insight into the sociopolitical and the
social psychological factors affecting the formulation of strategic
problems. As firms spend less time explicitly defining these messy
problems, the sociopolitical dynamics become more important (Pfeffer,
Salancik and Leblebici , 1976).
Third, although research on individual and cognitive decision-
making does not aid in the understanding of the social dynamics, it does
explain why strategic problem formulation is a dilemma. Individuals
will view the same situation or environmental cues differently. Thus,
given that there will be multiple cues, there will also be multiple
interpretations of these cues. An individual's interpretation will be
a function of his/her background and prior experiences (MacCrimmon and
Taylor, 1976; Morgan and Ramirez, 1984). Further, individuals have
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many factors influencing their perceptions of the cues including expert
opinions, stress, timing, frequency of cues, additional cues, and so
on. These factors may lead to cognitive biases (Schwenk, 1984;
Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981) in the problem formulation process.
Clearly, strategic problem formulation is a complex process that
starts with cues being sensed by individuals. The process emerges into
an organizational process in which biases are commonly introduced.
Although some normative approaches have been suggested (Mitroff and
Mason, 1980; Schwenk and Thomas, 1983), it is still not clear what
variables are involved, how these interact and what debiasing procedures
exist.
PROBLEM FORMULATION APPROACHES
Studies of the strategic problem formulation process (Lyles and
Mitroff, 1980; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976) lead to the
identification of many confounding factors in the process. These
include the level of analysis, selection of variables, measurement of
variables, and types of methodologies. The nature of the alternative
conceptual frameworks and underlying assumptions must be specified in
order to clarify current approaches and to make them explicit so that
they can be tested. Table 1 summarizes these approaches which repre-
sent the primary categories for multiple perspectives of strategic
decision-making as identified by Allison (1971), Cohen, March and
Olsen (1972); Janis and Mann (1977), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
Insert Table 1 About Here
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A range of alternative perspectives are used in the following sec-
tion to develop an organizing model for strategic problem formulation.
They range from rational models of decision-making which assume that
problems are already pre-formulated and that the decision task involves
choice amongst alternative options to political models (Cyert and March,
1963)) which assume that relevant coalitions have essentially pre-
formulated the problems according to their own interests and that social
interaction and power will condition the choice among competing formula-
tions. Even though garbage can models (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972)
recognize that problems are not pre-formulated , these models focus on
the decision process rather than on the nature of problem formulation.
Clearly, therefore, variations in problem formulation by organiza-
tional participants are a neglected issue in research on organiza-
tional decision-making and organizational performance.
Rational Approach
The Rational Approach corresponds to the classical economic view
of decision-making. It is the benchmark against which other approaches
are evaluated. It is grounded in rationality, optimality, and con-
sistency (Allison, 1971) and assumes that decisions emerge from a pro-
cess of conscious choice.
In treating problem formulation, this approach assumes that
full information is available and that the one right formulation of
the problem will be determined after an examination of the symptoms.
Social-psychological factors such as power, conflict, fears, credi-
bility or turnover will not influence the process. The manager
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provides the resources and personnel necessary Co gather information
about the symptoms and to analyze them.
This approach assumes that the correct formulation can be deter-
mined and that there are no biases inherent in the process. A problem
can be determined by analyzing the deviation from the specified goals
or objectives. Pounds (1969) expresses this approach. Problem for-
mulation is not valued as a particularly important element of rational
choice: the correct formulation of the nature of the problem is a
given. Yet researchers such as Raiffa (1968) note the "error of the
third kind" in rational approaches, namely, solving the wrong problem.
It is clear that many of the assumptions of this approach are
problematic, and few theorists have accepted this view as descriptive
of how organizations formulate the nature of strategic decisions.
Perhaps the most recent and well-quoted example of the relation-
ship between the Rational view and strategic problem formulation is
Porter's (1980) work on competitive strategy. Porter concentrates on
the interaction between characteristics of industry structure and the
firm's environment. The essence of the argument is that strategy is
a match between the firm and industry characteristics and that firm
strategy is constrained by industry structure and its evolution
through time. Defining the problem is not an issue.
Some theorists are softening their positions about rational
analytic models as being useful only for low-level managerial problems
of a housekeeping variety. Mason and Mitroff (1981, p. 367) welcome
the advent of user-oriented computer modelling systems (Keen and
Wagner, 1979; Wagner, 1979) which allow the user to build almost
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directly, in natural language, firm-level, business-level and competi-
tive response models.
While such models do not yet incorporate differing stakeholder
viewpoints, the trend towards analytical models as aids in a process
of policy dialogue is being reflected by other authors. Hertz and
Thomas (1983) and Thomas (1984) stress this strategic dialogue theme
and argue that analysis and formulation are parts of a policy dialogue
process which is iterative, adaptive and flexible. This dialogue
involves the consideration by management of problem and policy for-
mulation through a continual reexamination of potential alternatives
strategies and problem assumptions using several passes of an analytic
modelling framework. Based on a laboratory study, Schwenk and Thomas
(1983) conclude that alternative analyses based on different assump-
tions may help decision-makers improve the quality of decisions.
Avoidance Approach
One approach is Avoidance of the problem and is based on the
assumptions that the status quo must be maintained and that, if
symptoms to a problem are ignored, the problem will eventually go
away. If symptoms change frequently over time, why spend time or
energy on defining the nature of the problem?
The decision-making norms of an organization may be to avoid the
identification of new problems (Janis and Mann, 1977). New problems
may indicate that management is not doing its job or that someone
powerful is responsible for a major problem (Lyles and Mitroff, 1980).
Additional support for the existence of this approach relies on
the belief that organizations will avoid uncertainty (Cyert and March,
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1963) and will avoid making decisions (Barnard, 1938). Butler, et. al
(1979) suggest that Avoidance occurs in organizations where there is
no pressure for new activities or no competition for resources.
Recognition of a problem will occur only when the organization must
acknowledge it because of the threat or disruption to the status quo.
If it is perceived that the recognition of a problem will result
in a loss of power or prestige, avoidance will be likely. In fact
the larger the perceived threat, the more likely will be avoidance
behavior (Hermann, 1972).
Biases that appear to be inherent in this approach are selective
perception and attention, as well as rationalization. Organizations
will focus their attention on factors which are unchanging, positive
reporting mechanisms, and hopeful assertions about the future as
mechanisms to avoid the recognition of the problem.
Adaptive Approach
An extension of the previous approach is the Adaptive approach.
It values the status quo but for different reasons than the Avoidance
approach. The Adaptive approach is based on the assumption that since
the environment is highly uncertain and rapidly changing, organiza-
tions can move too quickly at identifying new problems. Thus it does
not suggest that maintaining the status quo is the most important
criterion but that change must be introduced slowly and incrementally.
Quinn summarizes this:
To improve both the information content and the process
aspect of decisions surrounding precipitating events,
logic dictates and practice affirms that they are nor-
mally best handled carefully and consciously incremen-
tally, to make decisions as late as possible consistent
with the information available and needed. (1980, 22)
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A shared social perception of the state of the organization de-
fines the status quo. This corresponds to Weick's (1969) retention
system or Billings, et. al . ' s (1980) existing state. It is accepted
that identifying new problems is a necessary evil and that some change
may be necessary as well. This should not, however, create dramatic
change in the status quo.
Another underlying assumption is that organizations can make
decisions too quickly about the nature of the problem. It is better
to go slowly, take incremental steps, and be flexible to new informa-
tion (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970; Lindblom, 1959; Vickers, 1965). A
necessary component of this approach is the presence of sufficient time
for problem recognition, a moderate amount of discontinuity in starts
and stops when problems are formulated, and cycles and recycles over
time involving problem re-formulation. There would be no simple
sequence of steps (Butler, et. al
.
, 1979; Lyles, 1981; Mintzberg, et.
al., 1976) in the problem formulation process.
Biases introduced in this approach would be escalating commitment
(Staw, 1981) to the first view and utilizing new data to support this
view; the illusion of better control by moving slowly; and selective
perception of information. Identification of problems that would
create major change would often be avoided.
Political Approach
The essence of the Political approach is the subjective construction
of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Coalitions within organiza-
tions will use their own histories and experiences to construct a view
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of the problem (Axelrod, 1976; Taylor, 1975). As a result each will
represent the nature of the problem in light of their own domain or
interests (Hayes and Simon, 1977; Cyert and March, 1963). Hence,
coalitions will be politically motivated to support one view of a
problem over other views since the way the nature of the problem is
resolved will have an impact on the way future resources will be
allocated (Abell, 1977; Allison, 1971; Bower, 1970; Pfeffer, 1981).
Groups will attempt to get the support of the powerful people for
confirmation of their view of the world (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983;
Lyles, 1981; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980).
The assumptions of this view are contrary to those of the Rational
approach. Here it is assumed that people are biased and personally
motivated. Even if everyone looks at the same symptoms of a problem,
they will commonly adopt different viewpoints about its nature and
characteristics. Full information will never be available and there is
no way to determine the one best view. Further, this approach is based
on the assumption that it is best to minimize conflict and debate by
coalescing support, agreement, and power behind one view (Pfeffer, 1981)
Certain biases may occur with this approach. Social pressures
caused by peer pressure and the power of others will be evident. Esca-
lating commitment to a particular view may also be present. The illu-
sion of control (Langer, 1975) will also be influential since certain
groups will be perceived as experts and expected to know more about the
situation than others.
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Decisive Approach
The Decisive approach extends the Political approach one step
further by suggesting that there are inherent inconsistencies in the
way people experience information. Their ability to make sense out
of symptoms is based on past actions, successes and understandings of
cause and effect (Bougon, et. al
.
, 1977). Weick (1969) argues that
it is only through managers' perceptions of the environment that the
environment can be sensed and understood by the organization. Hambrick
and Snow (1977) reinforce this view by suggesting how imperfect en-
vironmental scanning, selective perception and biased viewpoints dis-
tort information into managerial perceptions which guide strategic
decision-making. They also point out how experience and past strategy-
performance relationships can influence strategy formulation through
the interplay of managerial perception with the current strategic
problem.
Thus individual interpretations of problems are not accurate
because other variables such as recency, frequency and availability of
information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) and associated cognitive
biases become important (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). Furthermore,
everyone has ready made solutions that they fit to situations and in
fact use these solutions to structure or formulate the problem
(Bartunek, 1984; Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972; Starbuck and Hedberg,
1977).
Consequently deciding on the problem's nature is not particularly
important: it is too nebulous and too time-consuming. It is also an
illusion that management can control the many interacting contigencies
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that affect the firm's future. Biases introduced in this approach are
emotional stress, social pressures, prior hypothesis bias, and illusion
of contol. Therefore management should not worry about resolving the
nature of the problem but should decide on an action to be taken, do
it, and then assess what has happened (Salancik and Meindl, 1984).
These are the action generators that Starbuck describes (1983).
FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS
Although these categorizations of strategic problem formulation
exist in the research literature, there has been little empirical
testing of alternative models. What is known is that the formulation
of strategic problems influences the firm's strategic choices, that
firms operate in environments of varying levels of uncertainty, and
that firms faced with higher levels of environmental uncertainty will
tend to confront a broader range of unanticipated events. What we do
not know is to what extent these models accurately describe the stra-
tegic problem formulation process and under what conditions.
Therefore, in the following paragraphs an inventory of research
propositions is presented to guide future research. This research
probably requires the extensive use of field research methods in order
for researchers to develop a deep, 'fine-grained' understanding of
problem formulation processes.
Low Environmental Uncertainty
Under environmental conditions of low uncertainty, the signals
indicating a problem would tend to be clear and unconfusing. They
would be viewed similarly by many people and there would be consensus
-16-
about Che nature of the problem. Realistically this condition exists
most commonly in situations where the strategic problem is defined
through government legislation or other stakeholder groups. Under
these conditions we might expect the Rational or the Avoidance models
to be used. This expectation is formalized in terms of Proposition 1
below.
Proposition 1: When the level of environmental uncertainty
(whether macroeconomic , technological, organizational or
industry-based) is relatively low, problem formulation is a
simpler, consensual task in which decision-makers tend to
act in accordance with the prescriptions of either Rational
or problem Avoidance models of problem formulation.
High Environmental Uncertainty
When the indicators of a strategic problem provide weak,
conflicting, and/or discontinuous signals, much subjectivity exists in
the interpretation of the signals and in the conduct of the problem
formulation process. Consequently, there will be varying views about
the problem's nature and consensus is often ruled out. Further, as
environmental uncertainty increases, there will be unanticipated
events and additional disagreement about the problem's nature and
existence. Under these conditions, strategic problem formulation
skills become most important and require the balancing of alternative
problem viewpoints.
Proposition 2 below stresses the more flexible skills required for
problem formulation in conditions involving significant environmental
uncertainty.
Proposition 2: When the level of environmental uncertainty
is relatively high, problem formulation skills become cru-
cial. In these conditions, problem formulation becomes a
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negotiated outcome in which the problem perspectives of
alternative actors must be balanced by key decision makers.
Understanding the alternative perspectives involves the
examination of a range of problem formulation models.
A major research gap also exists in determining how firms which
perform successfully in conditions of high uncertainty sense and for-
mulate strategic problems. Certain research hypotheses suggest them-
selves. For example, do these firms attach little meaning to the
stimuli and thus, take actions? Do these diverse stimuli become part
of the conceptual map of the organization and eventually create link-
ages of cause-effect relationships? Do these firms define the problems
in terms of old problems that have already been solved through the
firm's success programs? However, the research literature on organi-
zational learning and adaptation (Fiol and Lyles, 1985) suggests that
successful problem formulation is closely related to organizational
learning capabilities. This is formulated in terms of Proposition 3
below.
Proposition 3: Successful organizations facing high situa-
tional complexity and uncertainty, learn to adapt over time
to unanticipated environmental events. Consequently, as
organizations learn, they are likely to develop strong
skills in identifying strategic issues and formulating
strategic problems.
Insert Table 2 about here
Characteristics of Problem Formulations
Theoretically the characteristics of good strategic problem for-
mulators and poor problem formulators can be readily identified.
Table 2 summarizes some of these characteristics and suggests further
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research propositions. For example, good problem formulators can be
expected to have had many past experiences with unanticipated events
which help to build new conceptual maps (Hedberg, 1974), a decentral-
ized communication system, and a planning culture that generates
multiple scenarios regarding unexpected events. Furthermore, good
problem formulators would tend to utilize inquiry methods that
generate raultiviews of the problem's nature and a strong debate
regarding differences in views (Churchman, 1971; Lyles and Mitroff,
1980; Mitroff and Betz, 1972).
In addition, it may be possible to formulate research propositions
about good organizational-level problem formulation. For example,
successful firms may have assembled a repertoire of responses that
range from adopting past success response programs, designing new pro-
grams, unlearning past programs through to generating appropriate
actions. Organizations that learn and adapt over time show this beha-
vior repertoire (Starbuck, 1983, Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Thus success-
ful firms might be expected to utilize all of the available problem
formulation models as part of their repertoire and to identity when to
use each one based on the situation. Testing this theoretical argu-
ment is fruitful ground for future research on strategic problem for-
mulation.
CONCLUSIONS
The problem formulation models discussed in this paper represent a
range of realistic, but conflicting, ideas about strategic problem
formulation. Each is based on different assumptions and effectiveness
criteria and incorporates different biases. Discovering which
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approach captures the essence of strategic problem formulation best is
a difficult exercise. It is perhaps better to identify the fit be-
tween managerial, empirical and subjective viewpoints in making a
choice about the problem's nature.
Strategic choice is regarded as a process involving a match bet-
ween managerial perception about the problem and the evidence about
the problem which emerges from more concrete analytical and formal
modelling processes such as environmental analysis, industry analysis
and so forth. Strategic problem formulation must also weigh evidence
drawn from analytic frameworks alongside the viewpoints emerging from
behavioral, social, political and organizational processes in arriving
at an appropriate problem formulation. It is suggested here that
strategic problem formulation (which conditions strategic choice) must
involve the balancing of these alternative problem viewpoints and
perspectives.
-20-
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TABLE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
STRATEGIC PROBLEM FORMULATORS
Successful
Unsuccessful
Context Defining Skills
1 General multiple 1 Multi views of ' Past success
scenarios of problem'
s
programs
worst case nature ' Newly designed
' Many past exper- ' Strong discus- programs
iences with sion or debate ' Unlearning
unanticipated ' Cognitive/ ' Actions
events experimental ' Discrimination
' Decentralized ' Managerial
abilities
' Tolerance for
ambiguity
' Use of meta-
phor/analogy/
maps
skills
1 Formalized ' Single view ' Past success
envi ronmental of problem's programs
scanning and nature
low scenario 1 Consensus or
operation mandated view
' Few past exper-
iences with
unanticipated
events
' Centralized
AWARENESS PROCESSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES
ENVIRONMENTAL
EVENTS
AWARENESS
MECHANISMS
ANTICIPATED
^
-^ FORMAL
r SCANNING
_Z *-», r ENVIRONMENTAL
SCANNING
t
ISSUE
MANAGEMENT
t
UNANTICIPATED \ ««w
STRATEGIC
PROBLEM
* 1
—J*"
FORMULATION
i nformalT^-^/
AWARENESS ^/'"^-^
t
NO MEANING
ATTACHED TO
UNEXPECTED
EVENT
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